New actor on militant front

Qasim A. Moini

Published about 12 hours ago

An improvised explosive device, believed to be the handiwork of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, was found planted near a mosque in Karachi last Saturday. The IED was defused by officials of the bomb disposal unit.—White Star

THE presence of Al Qaeda in Pakistan is nothing new. Arrests of members of the militant franchise have been reported on numerous occasions, while it was in Abbottabad where the outfit’s mastermind Osama bin Laden was assassinated by US forces in 2011.

However in September 2014, signs appeared that the terror network was looking to expand its footprint in this country, as AQ chief Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the establishment of a new franchise in the subcontinent. Since then, members of Al Qaeda Bar-i-Sagheer/Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) have reportedly been involved in the attack on the Karachi naval dockyard in September, while most recently an improvised explosive device bearing the group’s name was discovered and defused by law enforcers in Karachi.

Also read: Al Qaeda man among militants killed in Karachi: police

With an alphabet soup of militant groups already threatening Pakistan’s security, how seriously should the state view the emergence of AQIS? Leading security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana feels it is not something the authorities can choose to ignore.

“Although the footprints of Al Qaeda had been identified in major attacks inside Pakistan, the group was not considered important by the security apparatus and was always considered a part of the global problem and the responsibility of the US. After the establishment of AQ’s South Asia chapter, the threat from the group has increased.”

A retired senior law-enforcement official with extensive policing experience, on condition of anonymity, also agreed that the rise of AQIS should not be brushed aside by the state.

“[AQIS] cannot be taken lightly. It is like the Afghan Taliban and TTP developing a nexus broadly, though at times differing in their strategic objectives. There is method in this crazy game of building militant blocs. The proscribed Pakistani militant organisations may find a new impetus to recruit for this regional player.”

Mr Rana feels it is significant that rather than relying on foreign militants, AQIS has begun to recruit locally.

“This is the first time that AQ has opened its doors to local groups and individuals. This has happened because of the increasing influence of ISIS [the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] among Pakistani and Afghan terrorist groups and can intensify threats in the country and the region. Before the significant strategic change, AQ’s core was an exclusive club of Egyptian-, Saudi-, Yemeni- and Libyan-origin terrorists.

“Its chapters in the Arabian Peninsula, Maghreb, Iraq and African Sahel were loosely connected with the central command. The AQ core is not only trying to bring all these chapters under a unified command, but also establishing new chapters to compete with ISIS.”

Coming to ISIS, or Islamic State (IS), as the Middle East-based militant group has branded itself, it will be interesting to see whether pro-IS militants in Pakistan and AQIS operatives will join forces for the jihadi cause, or cross swords as they have done in the Mideast. Amir Rana feels a clash between the two is possible.

“The ISIS factor has provided a lifeline to the terrorist groups in the region. The groups that were not happy with AQ’s operational strategies are now more attracted to ISIS. Their frustration with AQ was mainly due to the conviction that their ultimate objective of establishing an Islamic state and system could not be achieved only through terrorist attacks. The ISIS model showed them the importance of controlling territory in order to project and establish power on the ground.

“AQ was operating through affiliates and realised it may not work in the future. It decided to recruit members directly instead of relying on local associates. ISIS will also affect the Afghan Taliban. While defections cannot be ruled out, it is unclear how ISIS will impact the Afghan Taliban movement, particularly when Mullah Omar wants to establish an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan, while al-Baghdadi [the IS ‘caliph’] wants to extend his Islamic state to the whole world.”

Interestingly, despite the rapid rise of IS in the Middle East, Mr Rana warns that AQ should not be considered washed up just yet.

“Apart from local groups’ inclination towards ISIS, AQ is still strong in the region and enjoys the role of an ideological, operational and strategic partner of the local terrorist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The chances of violent confrontations between AQ and its allies and ISIS-inspired groups cannot be ruled out, as the terrorist groups have a history of not tolerating emerging [outfits].”

Meanwhile, the former law-enforcement official warns of new fronts opening up in Pakistan.

“With the army operation in North Waziristan, the centre of gravity of militancy is going to shift to Punjab and Sindh and certain cross-border affiliations cannot be ruled out.”

Published in Dawn January 15th , 2015

http://www.dawn.com/news/1157114/new-actor-on-militant-front

Selective action the wrong approach

Editorial

Updated about 12 hours ago

.—AFP/File

OF the 72 banned militant groups in Pakistan, many are of the religiously inspired variety — precisely the category that the National Action Plan focuses on. But, according to a report in this newspaper yesterday, the interior ministry is drafting a plan to focus on a very small sub-set of the banned groups.

The immediate question: why? The political and military leadership has, particularly after the Peshawar massacre, been clear that the era of differentiating between militant groups operating on Pakistani soil is over.

No more good Taliban/bad Taliban, no more good militant/bad militant, and no difference between those attacking state and society today and those who harbour designs to eventually do so.

Take a look: Govt to act against ‘violent banned outfits’ only

Even as the leadership made those statements, there were doubts whether they had the will to follow through on them. Now, it appears, the doubts were well founded and possibly true.

The report in this newspaper yesterday quoted officials in the interior ministry as having claimed that in the so-called first phase action would only be taken against groups that have taken up arms against the Pakistani state.

Consider the many reasons why a narrow focus on a sub-set of religiously inspired militant groups is a bad idea. To begin with, if each of those militant groups in that particular category does not represent a threat to the Pakistani state and society, why is it on the banned list in the first place?

Surely, when the classification was originally made, it was done because each of those groups was either directly implicated in violence or was advocating violence.

After the Peshawar massacre, with a national consensus against militancy and terrorism, what reason could there be to delay action against groups that embrace violence and operate on Pakistani soil?

Perhaps an argument could be made that operationally it is preferable for the law-enforcement apparatus to start at the top of the list, with the very worst offenders, and then methodically make its way down.

However, there is a danger in that approach, specifically that delaying action at this stage will translate into no action later. Given the very large number of militant organisations here, there will always be a reason to delay action against certain groups.

It is also the identity of the banned groups against which action may be delayed that is revealing. Anti-India and pro-Kashmir groups with long-standing links to the army-led security establishment may not have a reason to take up arms against the state, but they are still very much incubators of hate and extremism.

With vast networks of mosques, madressahs and welfare organisations, those groups have penetrated deep into society, from where they pump poisonous ideologies and hateful messages into the bloodstream of this country.

Consider also the reality that in the not too distant past, most of the leadership of the banned TTP and likeminded groups was not considered a serious threat to the Pakistani state. If Pakistan is to win the fight against militancy, all militant groups must be dismantled.

Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2015

http://www.dawn.com/news/1156429/selective-action-the-wrong-approach